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RIGHT TO RETAIN ARREST RECORDS
initial stages of trial.44 However, because of over-emphasis ol the threat
of jurisdictional collusion, precedent has developed requiring an in-
dependent jurisdictional ground.45 Therefore, the extension of ancillary
jurisdiction to cover the original plaintiff's claim against the impleaded
party is less certain but arguably necessary if effect is to be given the
policy behind the federal rules and if the courts are going to perform
their primary function of settling the entire dispute.
E. L. KITTRELL SMITH
Constitutional Law-Right of Police to Retain Arrest Records
The advent of the computer, proposals for a new National Data Bank,1
development of means for rapid and efficient interchange of information,
and highly publicized incidents of police and military surveillance have
crystallized public concern over the information retention activities of
government agencies. This developing wariness of records would seem
to germinate from their accelerated capacity for harm. At present, masses
of records may be conveniently stored in computers subject to almost
instantaneous recall. The data retained by one organization may be
expeditiously conveyed to another on request.' The total effect of these
technological advances is an increased potentiality for evil as well as good.
The accuracy and validity of records that are damaging in nature must,
therefore, be laboriously scrutinized if the interests of individuals are not
to be crushed by a newly mechanized bureaucracy.
A recent federal case, Menard v. Mitchell,3 outlined many of the
competing considerations involved in the right of the police to keep records
of arrests. The plaintiff brought an action seeking to compel the Attorney
General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Invest.gation to ex-
" At least another potential problem area has been avoided where the main
claim is dismissed leaving only the third-party defendant's claim which lacks an
independent jurisdictional base, for "[j]urisdiction once acquired is not lost by
changes in the situation leaving only ancillary matters for determination." 1A
BAR ON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 658.
'" See note 29 supra.
'For an analysis of the advisability of a National Data Bank see generally J.
ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG].
Id. 64-68.
'430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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punge records4 of his arrest and detention for burglary in California.'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in reversing a sum-
mary judgment for defendants stated that the record was not sufficiently
complete to permit summary judgment and remanded for a trial on the
merits.
Since the court refused to surmise the actual nature of the facts in
the case, the opinion dealt extensively with the entire question of arrest
records. Appropriate dispositions were indicated for various hypothetical
fact situations. Basically four fact situations which may be arranged in
an order of ascending analytical complexity, are possible. An arrest may
be made: 1) without probable cause for purposes other than prosecution,
2) in good faith but without probable cause, 3) with probable cause but
further investigation proves exonerating, or 4) with probable cause but
the prosecutorial process is not invoked. The import of Menard lies in
the guidelines established for resolving the issue of the police right to
retain records in these various contexts.
Arrests made for purposes other than prosecution are essentially puni-
tive in nature.6 Such arrests are employed as a substitute for the full
criminal process when the criminal process is considered inappropriate
or unavailable. In particular, prostitutes and those who violate liquor and
gambling laws are vulnerable to arrests made on little or no actual evidence
for the purpose of harassing their operations.7 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Price,' stated that "[i]f the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bids denial of counsel, it clearly denounces denial of any trial at all.' The
court in Menard, relying on Price, severely questioned retention of records
of arrests made for the purpose of harassing an individual.' Such a prac-
tice would constitute a nonjudicial punishment in violation of due process.
The arrest record constitutes one aspect of the total punitive effect of an
arrest when made solely for the purpose of achieving that effect. There-
'The FBI retains these records pursuant to the statutory authorization in 28
U.S.C. § 534(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1965-69).
'The plaintiff was released under CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(b) (1) (West 1970).
'But see United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932), in which the
court contended that compiling police records cannot be characterized as punish-
ment.
'P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 219-35 (1969). Individuals may be arrested in
order to maintain a proper level of respect for law enforcement officials. Id. at 89-
98.
383 U.S. 787 (1966).
'Id. at 799.
10 430 F.2d at 494.
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fore, memoralization of arrests in this first category is constitutionally
defective for want of due process.
A strong constitutional argument may be made for precluding the
retention of records of any arrest not resulting from probable cause and
when probable cause never develops. A significant line of Supreme Court
decisions has proscribed the use of "fruits" of an illegal seizure. In
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States" the government was pre-
vented from using information gained by reviewing illegally seized docu-
ments. Davis v. Mississippi'2 prohibited the admission of fingerprints
secured as a result of an unlawful detention. Finally, Wong Sun v.
United States'" established that verbal testimony ascertained to be the
product of an unlawful arrest was inadmissible. In light of these cases
the consideration narrows to a question of whether a record of an illegal-
i.e., without probable cause-arrest is the "fruit" of that arrest.
Since an arrest record has no independent significance and simply
represents a transcription of the fact that an arrest occurred, a more direct
product of an arrest is difficult to imagine. Significantly, an arrest
record is employed primarily as an investigative aid-the precise use
prohibited by the Court.'4 Admittedly, the record could be used only in
investigation of subsequent criminal activity, but the prohibition estab-
lished by Silverthorne was not confined to use in a particular case or
point in time.'5 As a deterrent to illegal arrests, the police are restrained
from any use of the products of such arrests. To permit the police to
derive any benefit from an illegal arrest undermines the policy behind the
exclusionary rule.'
When an arrest with probable cause terminates in exoneration, basic
fairness would seem to preclude retention of a record. The court in Menard
alluded to this question by reference to the fact that certainly no record
could have been kept if an arrest had not occurred.' 7 The import of this
argument is that since the arrest resulted from a mistake, even though a
reasonable one, it should not have occurred. Consequently, the police
having initiated the mistaken arrest are under an obligation to restore the
11251 U.S. 385 (1920).
12394 U.S. 721 (1969).
13371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
12251 U.S. at 392.
18See the rationale expressed concerning the exclusionary rule in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
17430 F.2d at 491.
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individual as much as is possible to his position previous to the arrest.,,
The only legitimate police interest in this situation is based solely upon
the need to maintain statistical data such as the number of arrests during
a certain month. To facilitate this purpose, it is unnecesary for the record
to disclose the identity of the individual. Administrative ease is not served
by requiring two sets of records, one involving the identity, and the other
not. Nevertheless, it would be inequitable to permit the police to take
advantage of even an honest mistake to the detriment of an individual,
administrative ease notwithstanding.
The most difficult problem concerns arrests resulting from probable
cause in which the suspect is released but not exonerated. There are two
facets to the resolution of this question. One concerns the dissemination
of arrest records to potential employers. But even if dissemination to
employers is not involved, a distinct problem remains as to whether the
mere presence of the arrest records in the police files impinges vital rights.
Because police records, particularly those of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, are subject to substantial dissemination,1" a person who
has an arrest record may be handicapped in seeking employment .2  This
potentiality raises an equal protection question to which the court in
Menard obliquely alluded.2' In ascertaining whether the right to keep
arrest records can withstand an attack based upon equal protection, the
nature of the right infringed is significant. The question is whether the
right is denominated as fundamental. In situations not involving funda-
mental rights, the government may make classifications so long as they
are not arbitrary.2  In such situations, those persons engaging in criminal
activity are placed in this classification based upon having an arrest record.
On the other hand, if fundamental rights are involved, the government
must justify its classification with a "compelling" interest.2 The Supreme
" For examples of liabilities that might result from an arrest record see Russell
v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (refusal of personal recognizance) ;
Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960) (government contended
bail should be denied).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1965-69), for the authorized extent of
dissemination. The ambiguity in the statutory phrase "other institutions" is clarified
somewhat in 430 F.2d at 492 n.33.
20 430 F.2d at 490 n.17.
2 [T]here is limit beyond which the government may not tread in devising
classifications that lump the innocent with the guilty." Id. at 492.
22 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); See also Karst, Invidious Dis-
crimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process
Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 716 (1969).
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Court in Levy v. Louisiaa24 held that the right to adjudicate a wrongful
death action involved the right of dependents to continued support and as
such was "fundamental."2 5 The analogy between the right of a family to
receive continued support and the right to obtain gainful employment to
provide similar support is clear. The inability to litigate a wrongful
death would constitute a complete destruction of the the right involved in
Levy. However, this aspect of Levy should not make the case dis-
tinguishable, even though the right to employment is only impaired by the
dissemination of an arrest record. Shapiro v. Thompso 26 involved no
more than an impairment of a right deemed fundamental-the right to
travel-and not its complete destruction.
The court in Menard did not overtly come to grips with Griswold v.
Comnecticut 7 and its implications in the police record context. In Griswold
the Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy beyond the bounds of
the enumerated protections"' and gave it an independent existence. The
"constitutionalization" of the right to privacy in Griswold may have
significant implications for the dissemination of police records. Under-
scoring this point is the fact that traditionally litigation concerning photo-
graphs and files maintained by the police was based upon the equitable
right to privacy.- Many of these cases involved "rogue's gallerys"
3 0
which because of their accessibility to the public compromised this basic
right.3 . While dispositions varied depending upon the significance given
the right in the particular jurisdiction, 2 these state court decisions were
pre-Griswold. The balancing of government and individual interests in
2,391 U.S. 68 (1968).
r Id. at 68-69.
2' 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2. 384 U.S. 479 (1965).
" The enumerated rights to privacy are found in U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV,
V. The right to association has been held to include the right to anonymity.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"8 Cases cited note 32 infra.
80 "Rogue's gallerys" are collections of photographs of persons who the police
believe to have participated in criminal activity. These photographs are shown to
members of the general public when they are attempting to identify the culprit of
a crime.
" See, e.g., Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905) ; Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
8" Compare State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946),
Molineux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904), and Owen v. Partridge, 40
Misc. 415, 82 N.Y.S. 248 (1903) with State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426,
153 S.W.2d 834 (1941), and McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d
514 (1945).
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this area must now be reconsidered with cognizance being given to
Griswold.
The government's interest in dissemination to employers is to protect
employers from persons with criminal propensity. This interest is cer-
tainly less vital than the crime investigation interest which is not impaired
by curtailment of dissemination. Further, given the unreliability of arrest
records not resulting in conviction as an indicator of criminal propensity, 8
the government's interest could be characterized as weak indeed.
The court in Menard offered two suggestions for dealing with
the problem of injury to employment opportunities. First, the records
could be made more complete. It is doubtful, though, that even an arrest
record stating "released because of insufficient evidence" would have a
completely neutral effect upon an employer. The clear fact seems to be
that arrest records of any type adversely affect job opportunities.8 4 Even
in Menard the court, while suggesting the need for more completeness,
recognized the inherent difficulty in neutralizing arrest records8' The
other alternative-curtailment of dissemination-provides the only effec-
tive means of preventing arrest records from infringing upon the rights
of employment and privacy.
Even if arrest records are not disseminated, an argument can be made
that the presence of a record in the police files infringes the right to
privacy. A person with an arrest record is in a substantially different
position vis-A-vis the police than other citizens. When a crime occurs,
those persons with "records" are more likely to be investigated concerning
that crime and if suspected, more likely to be arrested."0 The increased
efficiency and rapidity with which information may be disseminated
among law enforcement entities and ultimately down to individual police-
men enhances the possibility that an arrest record will result in investiga-
tionY.7 To the extent that an arrest record stimulates greater police in-
volvement in the life of an individual, his privacy is diminished.
Despite an innate feeling that an arrest record somehow compromises
8 See text p. 517-18 infra.
" "Mere arrest may destroy reputation, or cause the loss of a job, or visit grave
injury upon a family." Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U.
CHI. L. REv. 427, 431 (1960).
3 430 F.2d at 492-93.
8 Id. at 490-91. See also W. LAFAVE, ARREST 287-89 (1965), and E. WILLIAMS,
MODERN LA w ENFORCEMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 105-09 (1967), which con-
tain extensive analyses of reliance by the police upon information about past
criminal activity.8 ROSENBERG 64-68.
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privacy, it is difficult analytically to pinpoint the exact legal right invaded.
Since an arrest is a public act, a record of the event cannot by its existence
alone be an infringement upon privacy. Further, if the record influences
the police to make subsequent forays into a person's privacy, those acts
may be judged on their own merits. For example, a search, even though
it might not have been made in the absence of the suspect's record, may
be evaluated on the basis of its reasonableness at the time it occurred.3 8
A finding of reasonableness legitimatizes any invasion of privacy caused
by the arrest record. In short, it may be argued that the increased police
scrutiny resulting from an arrest record does not impugn privacy unless
the scrutiny itself is illegal. The legality of that scrutiny may be in-
dependently ascertained.
This contention, though compelling, it not completely persuasive. The
police certainly do not investigate, search, or arrest every time there is
legal justification to do so." An unreasonably retained arrest record
may constitute a significant criterion by which discretionary choices are
resolved. Therefore, even though the act is reasonable, the catalyst for
the act may not be. Arguably, an individual should be entitled to have
police discretion concerning even legitimate incursions into his private
life rest upon rational factors. The systematic introduction into the
decision-making process of an irrational factor, in the form of an un-
reasonably retained arrest record, would seem, therefore, to constitute an
infringement of the right to privacy. Further, a person has no remedy if
the police search or detain him on the basis of an arrest record, and then
release him. The fact that the subsequent act of invasion of privacy result-
ing from the record could theoretically be judged on its own merits becomes
unimportant since no opportunity would arise to determine its reasonable-
ness. The only realistic means of precluding these attacks on privacy is to
eliminate the inaccurate record from which they stem.
An emerging pattern of state and federal court decisions limiting
police surveillance' may also be relevant to police retention of criminal
records. The United States Supreme Court has for some time looked
disconsolately upon laws that exert a chilling effect on first amendment
"See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
" See Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 559-62
(1960).
"See, e.g., Bee See Books Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Hicks v. Knight, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1504, 1505 (E.D. La. 1965) (prohibiting
police from concealing identity).
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rights.4 A recent state court caseP and an older federal case48 extend to
police surveillance the same type of rationale that is behind the "chilling
effect" principle. These cases could portend important limitations upon
police practices adversely affecting speech and association when the state
interest is negligible or could be satisfied by a more circumscribed pro-
cedure.
The importance of this "chilling effect" doctrine is readily apparent
in cases of arrest resulting from activities within the realm of first amend-
ment applicability. An individual espousing viewpoints or participating
in associations that the police consider "suspect" might well carry on
these activities with far greater circumspection if he knew the police were
aware of what he was doing. An awareness by the police based upon an
arrest record for trespass during a "sit in," as an example, does not
seem dissimilar from an awareness based on surveillance or police pres-
ence. In each case, the individual is more visible to the police than other
persons. The individual's reaction to this enhanced visibility can inhibit
the vigorous exercise of first amendment rights. Consequently, retention
of the records of "political" arrests undermines a most crucial constitu-
tional prerogative.
A somewhat strained argument may be made that the reason for the
arrest does not affect the application of the "chilling effect" principle.
The apprehension caused by an arrest record results from a reaction to the
"E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2 Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (1969), rezvd, 56 N.J.
210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). The trial court held unconstitutional as unduly inhibiting
first amendment rights a police procedure directed at gathering information about
lawful activity looking toward civil disturbances; the reversal was based, however,
to a significant extent upon the scantiness of the trial record and a belief that the
lower court's injunction suffered from overbreadth. 56 N.J. at 215, 231-32; 265
A.2d at 681, 687. In addition to the rather narrow grounds for reversal and re-
mand, the trial court decision remains important because of the validity of its
logic. The trial court's holding would, without reversal, have been quite limited
in its precedent effect. Therefore, the significance of the case is dependent on the
persuasiveness of its reasoning. The lower court's opinion has been commented
upon favorably in Askin, Police Dossiers and Energing Principles of First Amend-
inent Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970); Schlam, Police Intimidation
Through "Surveillance" May be Enjoined as an Unconstitutional Violation of
Rights of Assembly and Free Expression, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 130 (1969);
Note, Constitutional Law--Illegality of Police Program to Gather Information on
Civil Disorders, 48 N.C.L. REv. 648 (1970).
'" Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind.
1948), prohibited police attendance at a union meeting on the basis that such
presence would inhibit the union members' exercise of their first amendment free-
doms.
[Vol. 49
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potentiality for intensified police scrutiny. Consequently, the fact of
greater police awareness rather than its source is critical. Further, the
failure of an individual to exercise the full range of his first amendment
rights in the past does not justify a practice inhibiting their exercise in
the future. However, the cause and effect relationship between possessing
an arrest record for burgulary and refraining from unrelated associational
actvities is tenuous.
The fact that arrest records cannot be reconciled with certain in-
dividual rights does not give rise to an absolute prohibition of record
retention.44 The equal protection, privacy, and first amendment considera-
tions only indicate that there is something on the other side of the scales
against which the state interest must be balanced. The files maintained
by the police are used as a tool in the investigation of crime. Certainly, the
government's interest in criminal investigation is compelling. However,
this does not mean that the interest in keeping records of every arrest, even
those based on probable cause, is sufficient to overcome the individual's
interests. 5 The value of an arrest record as an investigative aid is based
upon two assumptions: 1) the individual arrested did, in fact, commit the
crime of which he is accused, and 2) his commission of this crime indicates
a propensity to commit subsequent crimes. To the degree that a particular
arrest record does not vindicate these assumptions, its value in police
investigation is reduced and the government's interest in it wanes. At some
point the government's interest is no longer sufficient to justify its in-
fringement upon individual rights.
In ascertaining the extent of the government's interest in a particular
case, the reason for the termination of the criminal process is critical. The
police or the prosecutor may decide not to attempt prosecution for any
number of legitimate reasons. Many of these reasons provide insights
into whether the assumptions warranting keeping arrest records are
founded in a particular case. If the evidence is insufficient to take the
case to trial,4" a record of such arrest would, at best, be of little value and
could prove misleading. A substantial number of cases are not prosecuted
"The court in the principal case refused plaintiff's motion for a summary
judgment. 430 F.2d at 490.
' See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). "[Wihen an
accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged without conviction, no
public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal identification records." Id.
at 970.
"' This lack of evidence is one basis for release under CAL. PENAL CODE § 849
(b) (1) (West 1970).
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because the prosecuting witness withdraws his complaint.47 Many of these
cases involve marital spats and insignificant conflicts between individuals
who attempt to invoke the criminal process to salve injured feelings.48
It is very doubtful whether such minimal criminal activity indicates any
propensity to commit subsequent crimes. The same may be said for cases
in which the police department or prosecutor makes an independent
decision that the case is too trivial to be tried. These examples serve to
illustrate situations in which the state interest on balance is not very
compelling.
On the other hand, a failure to prosecute resulting, for example, from
the death or unavailability of a crucial witness would not preclude a
probability of actual guilt sufficient to necessitate keeping the record of
arrest.4" The overburdening of our court system may force prosecutors
into hard choices concerning which cases to take to trial. A release
resulting from inability to provide a speedy trial would not go to the
merits of the case. As can be seen, each case must rest upon its particular
facts. A single rule of generalized applicability is impossible. However,
at a minimum, the police should be prevented from accumulating records
on persons whose criminal activity is either very doubtful or insignificant.
The determination that certain criteria must be met for the retention
of arrest records to .be permitted is not alone sufficient. If the decision
as to whether the standard has been satisfied simply becomes another aspect
of the police and prosecutorial discretion, any protection for the right of
privacy would be illusory. It is enlightening to note the means used to
protect another constitutionally founded personal right. The police are
required by inferences from the specific language in the fourth amend-
ment to establish before an independent magistrate the necessity of search-
ing a man's home.5" The reason for this requirement is the inability of
the police to objectivity balance the competing interests." In addition,
since the intrusion is a product of police activity, the police are required
to sustain the burden of justification and initiate the process for judicial
determination. The same rationale could support a requirement that an
independent magistrate decide when the police may retain arrest records.
The ease with which records of even insignificant value may be main-
"' Note, Prosecntor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1068 (1955).
I Id. at 1069.
"Id. at 1068."U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
1In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Supreme Court held the police
affidavit supporting a search warrant insufficient to establish probable cause.
[Vol. 49
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tained would mitigate in favor of the police considering virtually all
arrest records essential. An opportunity for a collateral attack upon the
police discretion would be beyond the means of most individuals and,
consequently, would not constitute a viable remedy. A procedure similar
to that used in issuing search warrants would serve the dual purpose of
providing objectivity and alleviating the necessity of the individual taking
the initiative in protecting fundamental rights. In addition, a high vis-
ibility decision-making process would facilitate judicial establishment of
standardized guidelines by which the close cases could be resolved. Ad-
mittedly, this procedure is not demanded by the language of the constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally been willing to require
particular procedures when it is apparent they are essential to insure
constitutionally protected rights. 2
Constantly expanding capacity to secure and maintain massive quan-
tities of data on individuals has placed the right to privacy on the cutting
edge of the law. Menard represents the beginning of more intense judicial
involvement in this area. However, a definitive demarcation by appellate
courts of the boundaries of police rights in the record retention context
is critical.
Coy E. BREWER, JR.
Constitutional Law-The North Carolina Public Assistance Lien Law
and Current Constitutional Doctrine
"Beneficient provisions for the poor, the unfortunate and orphan [is]
one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian state. . . ."I Such was
the philosophy of "welfare" when the framers wrote the North Carolina
Constitution of 1868. By mid-twentieth century, however, the "benef-
icence" associated with public assistance in North Carolina was sharply
curtailed for some groups among the poor. The change came with the
enactment of North Carolina's first "welfare lien" laws.2 For the first time
in the state's history, public assistance was conditioned on eventual repay-
ment through statutory liens on real property.'
"'An excellent example of a procedure established by the courts to secure a con-
stitutionally based right is that outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'N.C. CONsT. art. XI, § 7 (1868).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-29 to -37.1 (Supp. 1969).
'As recently as 1969, thirty-three other states had some type of repayment pro-
visions under federal-state funded programs. While such provisions are not required
1971]
